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I. INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments in 1976
(MDA) in order to protect consumers from defective medical devices
before these medical devices are marketed by manufacturers.' Prior
to the MDA's enactment, manufacturers sold products that
malfunctioned inside patients, which led to serious injuries and death.
Because of the thousands of tort lawsuits that resulted from such
malfunctions, Congress stepped in and supplemented the current tort
law system with the Medical Device Amendments.
Under the Medical Device Amendments, manufacturers of
complex devices must submit applications for premarket approval by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before they can sell these
devices to consumers. 2 However, ten years after the MDA was
enacted, manufacturers began to use the pre-emption provision in the
MDA, 21 U.S.C. § 360k, to escape liability for defective products it
had marketed. Manufacturers of defective devices began arguing that
because its device has been granted premarket approval by the FDA,
they were no longer responsible for any damages the device has
caused. However, this contradicts the purpose of the pre-emption
provision. Congress designed the pre-emption statute to prevent
manufacturers from being held liable in situations where state law
imposes requirements that are "different from, or in addition to"
those set forth by the MDA.3
On February 20, 2008, the Supreme Court interpreted the preemption statute broadly and overlooked Congress' purpose behind
enacting the MDA. In Riegel v. Medtronic, the Court held that the
MDA pre-empted state tort claims brought by a plaintiff who was
injured by a defective catheter.4 The Riegel decision leaves
consumers who are injured by defective medical devices with no
remedy. According to Riegel, so long as the FDA has granted a
* J.D. candidate, 2010, Pepperdine University School of Law. B.S., Biological

Sciences, Molecular, Cellular, and Developmental Biology, 2007, University of
California, Santa Barbara.
1.
2.
3.
4.

See H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 6-12 (1976).
Medical Device Amendments, 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c) (1976).
See H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 6-12 (1976).
See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
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Class III device premarket approval, then the manufacturer is no
longer liable for subsequent malfunctions. Though this holding gives
courts' certainty regarding the application of § 360k, it does not take
into account possible mistakes by the FDA. Specifically, it does not
take into account situations where the FDA wrongfully grants
premarket approval to a device. If the FDA does make a mistake,
Riegel holds that the consumer must bear the risk of injuries or even
death.
This case note presents a thorough examination of the Supreme
Court's recent opinion in Riegel and its effect on medical device
manufacturers and users of these devices. Part II details the historical
background of the regulation of medical devices beginning from pre1976 to the Court's Riegel decision in 2008. Part III summarizes the
facts of the Riegel decision. Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court's
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part V of this case
note will discuss the impact of the Riegel decision on plaintiffs
injured by defective medical devices. Part VI concludes this article.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Before 1976, the marketing of medical devices was primarily
unregulated.5 While drugs had to receive premarket approval by the
Food and Drug Administration, there were no such safeguards for
medical devices. 6 It was not until the mid-1970s that it became clear
to Congress that there needed to be a regulatory regime for medical
devices.7 During this time period, manufacturers had introduced
numerous complex medical devices into the market.8 While these
technological advancements helped many patients, defects in the
medical devices led to serious injuries and death, resulting in
thousands of tort claims. 9 Such defective devices included heart
valves, pacemakers, and intraocular lenses, but particularly, it was

5. See H.R. REP. No. 94-853 at 8-10.
6. Id. at 11 (a "serious drawback of the existing authority is that the FDA
cannot act against a hazardous medical device until after it is on the market.")
7. See id. at 8.

8. Id. at 9.
9. Id.
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the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device that provoked Congress to
impose premarket regulations on medical devices.' 0
In 1976, Congress responded to this public health nightmare by
enacting the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 to the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)."1 The sole purpose for the MDA
was "to protect public health," and to protect consumers that rely on
these complex medical devices for their livelihood.' 2
Under the MDA, medical devices are categorized into one of
13
three different classes depending on the level of risk they present.
First, Class I devices present the least amount of risk, and are subject
to "general controls.' 4 These are devices that "present minimal
potential for harm to the user," and can be marketed without prior
approval. 15 Examples of Class I devices include elastic bandages and
examination gloves.' 6 Second, Class II devices are devices that have
the potential to cause injury if they are misused or are defective.1 7 In
10. Id.
11. Medical Device Amendments, 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1976).
12. See H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 6-12.
13. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2006).
14. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A). Class I devices are subject to "general
controls" because they "[are] not purported or represented to be for a use in
supporting or sustaining human life or for use which is of substantial importance in
preventing impairment of human health, and does not present a potential
unreasonable risk of illness or injury.. ." 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B).
Class II Special Controls.A device which cannot be classified as a class I device because
the general controls by themselves are insufficient to provide
reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of
the
device, and for which there is sufficient information to establish
special controls to provide such assurance, including the
promulgation of performance standards, post-market
surveillance, patient registries, development and dissemination of
guidelines (including guidelines for the submission of clinical
data in premarket notification submissions in accordance with
section 360(k) of this title), recommendations, and other
appropriate actions as the Secretary deems necessary to provide
such assurance. For a device that is purported or represented to
be for use in supporting or sustaining human life, the Secretary
shall examine and identify the special controls, if any, that are
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addition to being subject to "general controls," these devices may
also be subject to "special controls" such as post-market surveillance,
performance standards, and/or any other measures the FDA deems
necessary.' 8 Class II devices include powered wheelchairs, surgical
drapes, and infusion pumps.' 9 Finally, Class III devices are the
riskiest and most regulated category of medical devices.20 Class III
devices impose the greatest risks, but also provide the greatest
21
benefits because they are life supporting or life-sustaining devices.
Examples of Class III devices include catheters, pacemakers,
22
replacement heart valves, and implanted cerebella stimulators.
In order to be marketed to consumers, Class III devices are
required to undergo a premarket approval process, or the PMA.2 3
Though all Class III devices eventually have to go through this
process, Class III devices that were on the market prior to 1976 are

necessary to provide adequate assurance of safety and
effectiveness and describe how such controlsprovide
such
assurance.
Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.

20. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
Class III, Premarket Approval.A device which because(i) it (I) cannot be classified as a class I device because
insufficient information exists to determine that the application
of general controls are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance
of the safety and effectiveness of the device, and (II) cannot be
classified as a class II device because insufficient information
exists to determine that the special controls
described
in
subparagraph (B) would provide reasonable assurance of its
safety and effectiveness, and (ii)(I) is purported or represented to
be for a use in supporting and sustaining human life or for a use
which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment
of
human health or (II) presents a potential unreasonable risk of
injury, is to be subject in accordance with section 360e of this
title, to premarket approval to provide reasonable assurance of its
safety and effectiveness.
Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1) (2006).
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not required to go through this process right away. 24 Instead, these
devices can continue to be marketed until the FDA issues a
regulation requiring that particular device to go through premarket
approval.25 Additionally, if the FDA finds that a new Class III device
is "substantially equivalent" to a device marketed before the MDA
was enacted, then this device can be "grandfathered" in.26 If a device
is "grandfathered" in, then it does not need to be granted premarket
approval until the time the FDA promulgates a regulation.27
According to 21 U.S.C. § 510(k), the process by which a Class III
device is determined to be a substantial equivalent of a device
28
already on the market is referred to as the "510(k)" process.
The premarket approval process requires the manufacturer of a
medical device to submit an application for review by the FDA.29
The application includes extensive reports, proposed labeling, and
proposed manufacturing and processing.3" Additionally, the FDA
requires a sample of the device. 3 ' On average, the FDA spends about
1,200 hours reviewing each application. 32 Premarket approval is
granted only when the FDA has found that there is a "reasonable
assurance" of the device's "safety and effectiveness." 33 Pursuant to
21 U.S.C. § 350c(a)(2)(C) of the MDA, the agency must "weig[h]
any probable benefit to health from the use of the device against any
probable risk of injury or illness from such use."34 The FDA also
requires a specimen of the proposed labeling for the device, and
reviews it to determine whether it is false or misleading.35 When the
FDA completes its review of the Class III device, it then
decides
36
device.
the
of
approval
premarket
deny
or
whether to grant
24. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360e(b)(1)(B), 360c(f)(1)(A).

25. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1).
26. Id.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
21 U.S.C. § 360e(c).
See 21 C.F.R. §§ 814.20, 814.4.
Id.

31. Id.
32. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1004.

33.
34.
35.
36.

21
21
21
21

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§ 360e(d).
§ 360c(a)(2)(C).
§§ 360c(a)(2)(B), 360e(d)(1)(A).
§ 360e(d).

Fall 2009

Bright Line Ruling in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.

After reviewing the PMA application, the FDA can do one of
four things.37 It can choose to grant the device premarket approval.38
It can choose to grant premarket approval, but only if the
manufacturer fulfills certain conditions. 39 The FDA can choose to
deny premarket approval and instead send an "approvable letter,"
which indicates to the manufacturer what it needs to do in order for
its device to be granted premarket approval.4 ° Or, the FDA can send
a "not approvable" letter to the manufacturer stating why the FDA
has chosen not to grant premarket approval for the proposed device.41
Moreover, even after a device has been granted premarket
approval, the PMA process still has not been fully completed.42
Under the process, the manufacturer is prohibited from making any
changes to the proposed specifications in the premarket approval
application.43 The manufacturer cannot make any changes to the
design specifications, the manufacturing processes, labeling, or any
other aspect of the device that relates to safety and effectiveness. 44 In
order to make changes, the applicant must submit a new application
for supplemental premarket approval. 45 The application for a
supplemental premarket approval is identical to the initial
application.46
Additionally, the manufacturer of the approved device must
47
comply with specific requirements set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 360i.
The FDA requires manufacturers to report any incidents in which a
device may have caused or contributed to serious injury or death.48
Also, it must report any malfunctions that may recur, and any new
clinical investigations or scientific studies relating to the device,
which the manufacturer either knows about or should reasonably
37. Id.
38. Id.

39. 21 C.F.R. § 861.1(b)(3) (2009).
40. 21 C.F.R. § 814.44(e) (2009).
41. 21 C.F.R. § 814.44(f) (2009).

42. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(6)(A)(i).
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(6); 21 C.F.R. § 814.39(c).
Id.

47. See 21 U.S.C. § 360i (2006).
48. 21 U.S.C. § 360i; 21 C.F.R. §§ 814.84(b)(2), 803.50(a) (2009).

652

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

29-2

know about. 49 If the reports indicate that the device is not safe or is
ineffective under the terms of its labeling, then the FDA has the
power to withdraw the device's premarket approval. °
Congress also included a pre-emption provision in the MDA.5 '
Congress included this pre-emption provision because, before the
MDA's enactment, some states had already created medical device
regulatory programs.5 2 Perhaps most notable is California's statute
that requires medical devices to undergo a premarket approval
53
process before being commercially distributed in that state.
California also requires medical device manufacturers to comply with
good manufacturing practices regulations. 54 Because of these state
statutes, Congress included a pre-emption provision in the MDA in
order to ensure that these state provisions do not conflict with those
set forth in the IMDA." The MDA's pre-emption provision, 21
U.S.C. § 360k, states:

49. Id.
50. 21 U.S.C. § 360e(e)(1) (2006); see also § 360h(e) (the FDA's recall
authority).
51. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2006).
52. See Robert B. Leflar & Robert S. Adler, The Preemption Pentad: Federal
Preemption of Products Liability Claims After Medtronic, 64 TENN. L. REV. 691,
703, n. 66 (1997) (discussing how thirteen states enacted statutes governing
medical devices after the Dalkon Shield failure).
53. 1970 Cal. Stats. Ch. 1573, §§ 26670-26693. When enacting the MDA, the
House Report observed the following with regards to the California premarket
approval process:
In the absence of effective Federal regulation of medical devices,
some States have established their own programs. The most
comprehensive State regulation of which the Committee is aware
is that of California, which in 1970 adopted the Sherman Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Law. This law requires premarket approval
of all new medical Devices, requires compliance of device
manufacturers with good manufacturing practices and authorizes
inspection of establishments which manufacture devices.
Implementation of the Sherman Law has resulted in the
requirement that intrauterine devices are subject to clearance in
California.
H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 45 (emphasis added).
54. Id.

55. Id.
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(a) General Rule. Except as provided in subsection
(b)... no State or political subdivision of a State may
establish or continue in effect with respect to a device
intended for human use any requirement(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any
requirement applicable under this Chapter [21 USCS
§§ 301 et seq.] to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the
device or to any other matter included in a
requirement applicable to the device under this
Chapter.
(b) Exempt Requirements. Upon application of a
State or a political subdivision thereof, the Secretary
may, by regulation promulgated after notice and
opportunity for an oral hearing, exempt from
subsection (a) . . ., under such conditions as may be
prescribed in such regulation, a requirement of such
State or political subdivision applicable to a device
intended for human use if(1) the requirement is more stringent than a
requirement under this Chapter which would be
applicable to the device if an exemption were not in
effect under this subsection or;
(2) the requirement(A) is required by compelling local conditions, and
(B) compliance with the requirement would not cause
the device to be in violation of applicable requirement
56
under this Chapter.
Further, Congress also included a savings clause in the MDA.57
The savings clause, 21 U.S.C. § 360h(d), states: "[c]ompliance with
not relieve any persons from
an order issued under this section shall
58
liability under Federal or State law."
Approximately ten years after the MDA was enacted, device
manufacturers started arguing that 21 U.S.C. § 360k expressly pre-

56. 21 U.S.C. § 360k.
57. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(d).
58. Id.
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empts common law claims under state law.5 9 In 1996, the Supreme
Court considered the scope of the pre-emption provision of the MDA
in the seminal case Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, and determined that the
statute does not pre-empt a state common law negligence claim
against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective pacemaker that
had been marketed under the 510(k) process.60
In Lohr, the plaintiffs pacemaker failed three years after it was
implanted. 6 1 This failure resulted in a "complete heart block," which
required plaintiff to undergo immediate surgery.62 The plaintiffs
doctor attributed the Medtronic pacemaker's failure to a defect in the
pacemaker's leads. 63 The pacemaker was a Class III device that was
grandfathered in under the 510k process, and had not yet been
required to undergo the premarket approval process. 64 Plaintiff and
her husband brought suit against Medtronic, the manufacturer of the
pacemaker, for negligence and strict liability under Florida state
law. 65 In its defense, Medtronic argued that the Lohrs' claims under
Florida State law were expressly pre-empted by the statutory text of
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).66
Justice Stevens, the author of the Court's opinion in Lohr, states
that Congress "does not cavalierly pre-empt state law causes of
action," and that the Court must consider the congressional purpose
He first tackles
behind the MDA's pre-emption statute. 67
Medtronic's argument that the term "requirement" in 21 U.S.C.
§ 360k is intended to include state common law claims. 68 In Justice
59. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).

60. Id.
61. Id. at 480-81.
62. Id. at 481.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 481. The negligence count alleged a breach of
Medtronic's "duty to use reasonable care in the design, manufacture, assembly, and
sale of the subject pacemaker." Id. Further, the Lohr's alleged strict liability on
the basis that "the device was in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous
to foreseeable users at the time of its sale." Id.
66. Id. at 486.
67. Id. at 485. The majority opinion mentions that the Court should assume
that the Federal Act would not supersede the historic police powers of the States.
Id.
68. Id. at 487.
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Stevens' opinion, the term "requirement" should refer to a "specific
duty upon the manufacturer." 69
He finds that Medtronic's
interpretation of requirement would foreclose injured plaintiffs from
being able to bring a private cause of action against manufacturers
for its defective product. 7' He interprets the term requirement
narrowly and considers the MDA's legislative history:
There is, to the best of our knowledge, nothing in the
hearings, the Committee Reports, or the debates
suggesting that any proponent of the legislation
intended a sweeping pre-emption of traditional
common-law remedies against manufacturers
and
distributors of defective devices. If Congress intended
such a result, its failure to even hint at it is
spectacularly odd, particularly since Members of both
Houses were acutely aware of ongoing product
liability litigation. Along with the less-than precise
language of § 360k(a), that silence surely
indicates
that at least some common law claims against medical
device manufacturers may be maintained after the
enactment of the MDA.7 '
Next, Justice Stevens finds that the 510(k) process does not
impose any federal requirement under the MDA that would pre-empt
the Lohr's common law claims.72 Because the Class III device was
grandfathered in, it has only been determined that the device is a
substantial equivalent of another device already on the market.73 He
reasons that the process has not imposed any requirements on the
device. 74 Additionally, the Court held that 21 U.S.C. § 360k does not
pre-empt state requirements that are parallel to federal
requirements. 75 The statute can only pre-empt state requirements that
are "different to, or in addition to," federal requirements.76 Thus, he

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 487-88.
Id. at 487.
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 490.
Id. at 493.
Id.
Id.

75. Id. at 498.
76. Id.
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concludes that none of the Lohrs' claims based on alleged defective
manufacturing or labeling are pre-empted by § 360k of the MDA.77
Lastly, Justice Stevens responds to the Lohrs' argument that
78
common law duties are never state requirements under § 360k.
However, the Court refuses to determine this issue, and Justice
Stevens writes:
Nevertheless, we do not respond directly to this
argument for two reasons. First, since none of the
Lohr's claims is pre-empted in this suit, we need not
resolve hypothetical cases that may arise in the future.
Second, given the critical importance
of
design
specificity in our (and the FDA's) construction of §
360k, it is apparent that few, if any, common law
duties have been pre-empted by this statute. It will be
rare indeed for a court hearing a common-law of
action to issue a decree that has "the effect of
establishing a substantive requirement for a specific
device." 21 CFR § 808.1(d)(6)(ii) (1995). Until such
a case arises, we see no need to determine whether the
79
statute explicitly preempts such a claim.
Both Justice Breyer, in his concurring opinion, and Justice
O'Connor, in her dissenting in part opinion, consider the Lohrs'
argument that common law duties are never state "requirements"
under § 360k.8° In Justice Breyer's concurring opinion, he states that
§ 360k will "sometimes preempt a state-law tort suit."81
In
determining this issue, he considers the rationale of the Court in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group., Inc., where the Court found that similar
language included tort actions. 82 According to Cipollone: "[state]
regulations can be as effectively exerted through an award of
damages as through some other form of preventive relief. 83 He
77. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 502.
78. Id. at 502-03.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 503-14.
81. Id. at 503 (Breyer, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 504-05. In Cipollone, the Court considered pre-emption of state
regulations with regards to cigarette labeling. See id.; infra note 151 and
accompanying text; see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
83. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521.
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finds this rationale applicable to the case at hand, and finds that
where a state regulation and a state tort suit would have the same
effect, and the state regulation would be pre-empted by the MDA,
then the MDA would also pre-empt the common law claims under
state law.

84

Justice Breyer concludes that the MDA does not pre-empt the tort
claims brought by the Lohrs. 85 He fids the MDA's preemption
statute "highly ambiguous," and says that the words "any [state]
requirement" and "any [federal] requirement," do not indicate what
Congress intended.86 However, he states that "in the absence of clear
congressional command as to pre-emption, courts may infer that the
relevant administrative agency possesses a degree of leeway to
determine which rules, regulations, or other administrative actions
will have pre-emptive effect." 87 Here, he concludes that the Lohrs'
claims are 88not pre-empted because the FDA requirements are not
"specific." Thus, he concurs with the judgment of the majority, but
89
concludes that the MDA can in fact pre-empt state tort actions.
Justice O'Connor filed a separate opinion where she concurred in
part and dissented in part. 90 She finds that where state common law
actions do impose requirements, they are pre-empted if they are
different than those under the MDA. 91 However, Justice O'Connor
disagrees with Justice Stevens' statement that a common law action
that would impose a "requirement" would be rare. 92 She refers to the
majority's decision as "bewildering and seemingly without guiding
principle." 93 Instead, Justice O'Connor reads the pre-emption statute
broadly and does not require the same level of "specificity" as the
majority did.94 She considers the Court's decision in Cipollone,
where the Court had determined that state common law damage
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Lohr, 518 U.S. at 521 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 505-08.
Id. at 505.
Id. at 505-08.
Id.
Id.

90.
91.
92.
93.

Lohr, 518 U.S. at 509-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 509.
Id.
Id.

94. Id. at 513.
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actions do constitute "requirements." 95 The Court in Cipollone found
no distinction between "positive enactments and common law.",96
She agrees with this rationale and construes § 360k broadly. 97 She
finds that "[s]ome, if not all, of the Lohr's common-law claims
regarding the manufacturing and labeling of Medtronic's device
would compel Medtronic to comply with requirements different
from, or in addition to, those required by the FDA."98
In 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in
Riegel v. Medtronic that Class III Devices that have undergone
premarket approval are subjected to federal requirements that preempt state common law actions. 99
In order to resolve the
inconsistencies that resulted in the aftermath of Lohr, the Supreme
00
Court granted certiorari to Riegel v. Medtronic.1
III. FACTS

Plaintiff Charles Riegel had a diseased and calcified right
coronary. 10 1 In 1996, he suffered a myocardial infraction and shortly
thereafter underwent coronary angioplasty. 10 2 During the coronary
angioplasty, Riegel's doctor attempted to dilate the artery by
inserting the Evergreen Balloon Catheter.'0 3 However, the catheter's
labeling had advised against using the catheter for patients with
diffuse or calcified stenoses. 10 4 Also, the label warned that the
catheter should not be inflated beyond its rated burst pressure of eight
atmospheres. 10 5 Yet despite these warnings, Riegel's doctor inflated
the catheter five times at a pressure of ten atmospheres. 10 6 On his

95. Id. at 510-11.
96. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 510-11.
97. Id. at 514.

98. Id. at 513.
99. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104, 107 (2nd Cir. 2006).
100. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1002 (2008).
101. Riegel, 451 F.3dat 107.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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fifth inflation, the catheter ruptured.'1 7
Consequently, Riegel
developed a heart block and was placed on life support.'18 Shortly
09
after, he underwent emergency coronary bypass surgery.'
Plaintiff Charles Riegel and his wife Donna Riegel brought this
lawsuit against defendant Medtronic, Inc., the manufacturer of the
catheter, in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of New York." 0 In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the design,
labels, and manufacturing of the catheter violated New York
common law, and that as a result of these violations, Riegel suffered
severe and permanent injuries."' The complaint raised a number of
common law claims." 2 On March 14, 2002, the district court held
that the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 pre-empted Plaintiffs
New York common law claims of strict liability, breach of implied
warranty, and negligence in design, testing, inspection, distribution,
labeling, marketing, and sale of the catheter.' '3 Additionally, the
district court also held that the MDA pre-empted any negligent
manufacturing claim that was not premised on a theory that
Medtronic violated federal law. 114
Finally, the district court
concluded that the MDA also pre-empted plaintiff Donna Riegel's
claims for loss of consortium, to the extent that it was a derivative of
5
the pre-empted claims."
Plaintiffs then appealed the district court's decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 1 6 The court of
appeals affirmed the district court's dismissals and concluded that
Medtronic was "clearly subject to the federal, device-specific
requirement of adhering to the standards contained in its individual,
federally approved" pre-market approval application.' 7 Plaintiff's
claims were pre-empted because they "would, if successful, impose
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Riegel, 451 F.3d at 107.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Riegel, 451 F.3dat 107.
Id.
Id.
Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1006.

117. Id.
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state requirements that differed from, or added to" the device-specific
federal requirements." 8 The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari.II 9
IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF OPINION

The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, was joined by
Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, Justice Thomas,
Justice Breyer, and Justice Alito. 20 Justice Stevens filed an opinion
12 1
concurring in part and concurring in the majority's judgment.
22
Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion.
A. Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia begins his opinion by identifying the main issue
before the Court: "[w]hether the pre-emption clause enacted in the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 360k, bars
common-law claims challenging the safety and effectiveness of a
medical device given premarket approval by the FDA."'123 Justice
Scalia resolves this issue in his four-part opinion.' 24 Part I discusses
the passage of the MDA of 1976, the FDA's regulation of complex
medical devices, and sets forth the main facts of the case.' 25 His
analysis begins in Parts II and III, where Justice Scalia interprets the
statutory text of 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a), and concludes that the Riegels'
claims are pre-empted by the statute.' 26 Finally, in Part IV Justice
Scalia notes that state duties "parallel" to the federal requirements are
not pre-empted by the statute, but that the Court declines to address

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1002.
121. Id. at 1011. Specifically, Justice Stevens joins all of the majority's
opinion except Parts III-A and 111-B. Id. at 1013.
122. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1013.
123. Id. at 1002.
124. Id. at 1002-11.
125. Id. at 1002-06.
126. Id. at 1006-11.
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whether the Riegels' claims are "parallel" because they failed to
make this contention in their prior briefs. 27
1. The Background
First, Justice Scalia describes the change in FDA's regulation of
complex medical devices after Congress passed the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976.128 Justice Scalia explains that Congress
passed the MDA in order to impose a regime of federal oversight
after the thousands of tort claims that resulted in the 1970s, when
medical devices were primarily regulated by the States. 129 After
reciting the statutory text of MDA's pre-emption provision, 21
U.S.C. § 360k(a), Justice Scalia explains that under the MDA,
medical devices were assigned to one of three classes based upon the
level of risks the device presents.' 30 Particularly, he focuses on Class
III devices, which are granted the most federal oversight under the
MDA. 13 1 While he could have discussed the risks imposed by Class
III devices, Justice Scalia instead focuses on the advantages that
Class III devices provide to human health. 132 Further, he refers to the

127. Id. at 1011.
128. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1002-03. 21 U.S.C § 360c et seq.
129. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1003. He explains that in the 1960s and 1970s, the
introduction of many complex devices led to some device failures, resulting in tort
claims against manufacturers. Id. In particular, he discusses the controversy
associated with the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, which led to several deaths,
serious infections, and a large number of pregnancies. Id. (citing R. BACIGAL, THE
LIMITS OF LITIGATION: THE DALKON SHIELD CONTROVERSY 3 (1990)).

Justice

Scalia further notes that the resulting law suits led many to believe that the
common law tort system was unable to manage the risks that accompany dangerous
devices. Id. (citing S. FOOTE, MANAGING THE MEDICAL ARMS RACE 151-152
(1992)). Thus, to supplement the common law tort system, states adopted statutes
to impose premarket regulations on devices. Id.
130. Id. See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying text.
131. Id. at 1003-05. According to Justice Scalia, a device is assigned to Class
III if "it cannot be established that a less stringent classification would provide
reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness." Id. at 1003. He gives examples
of Class III devices: replacement heart valves, implanted cerebella stimulators, and
pacemaker pulse generators. Id.
132. Id. at 1004. In his discussion of how the FDA grants premarket approval,
he states that the agency must "weig[h] any probable benefit to health from the use
of the device against any probable risk of injury or illness from such use." Id.
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premarket approval process as a "rigorous regime of premarket
approval for new Class III devices," and describes the premarket
approval process in detail, concentrating specifically on the steps
manufacturers must comply with in order to market a device. 33 He
states that manufacturers have to complete a "multivolume"
application, which the FDA spends an average of 1,200 hours
reviewing.' 34 Additionally, he emphasizes that even after the FDA
approves an application, the FDA has recall authority under the
MDA.

13 5

(citing 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2)(C)). Thus, if the benefits in light of the available
alternatives outweigh the great risks of a device, then the FDA may grant approval.
Id. To further illustrate this point he explains that the FDA granted approval, under
the Humanitarian Device Exemption procedures, to a ventricular assist device for
children with failing hearts, despite a less than fifty percent survival rate with
children using the device. Id. He reasons that because of the advantages that Class
III devices bring to human health, they are granted the most federal oversight. Id.
at 1003.
133. Id. He notes that most Class III devices do not have to undergo the
premarket approval process because they are "grandfathered" into the market under
the § 510(k) process. Id. at 1004. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
He sets forth the statistics from 2005, where the FDA "grandfathered" in 3,148
devices under the § 510k process, and granted premarket approval of only thirtytwo devices. Id. at 1004.
134. Id. To emphasize the amount of information the manufacturer must
submit, Justice Scalia states that the manufacturer must submit, "among other
things," full reports of all studies and investigations of the device's safety and
effectiveness that have been published or should reasonably be known to the
applicant, a full statement of the device's components, the methods used in
manufacturing, a specimen of the proposed labeling, and samples or device
components required by the FDA. Id. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying
text. By focusing on the information that needs to be submitted to the FDA, Justice
Scalia is trying to show that the FDA has obtained all the important information
about the device in question when determining whether or not to grant premarket
approval to the device. Id. Additionally, the FDA may consult with a panel of
outside experts who may request additional data from the manufacturer. Id. at
1004. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(G)).
Even after premarket approval, the
135. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1005.
manufacturer still must comply with reporting requirements, and the FDA may
withdraw premarket approval if it determines "that a device is unsafe or ineffective
under the conditions in its labeling." See id. supra note 45 and accompanying text;
see infra notes 189-90 and accompanying text; 21 U.S.C. § 360e(e)(l); see also §
360h(e) (recall authority).
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Next, Justice Scalia states the facts of the case and the Riegels'
claims against Medtronic. 36 In concluding Part I, he notes that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
Riegels' claims were pre-empted by 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) because
their claims would impose state requirements on Medtronic that
"differed from, or added to" the device specific federal
37
requirements. 1
2. Justice Scalia Determines that Premarket Approval Under the MDA
Imposes Federal Requirements Under 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
In Part II, Justice Scalia begins analyzing whether 21 U.S.C. §
360k(a) pre-empts the Riegels' common law claims.' 38 He starts his
determination by dissecting the statutory text.139 By the terms of the
statute, the MDA only preempts state requirements that are "different
from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable... to the device"
under federal law.' 4 ° In deciding whether the preemption statute
applies to the Riegels' claims, Justice Scalia first examines whether the
premarket approval process is a "requirement" under federal law.'41
To address this inquiry, Justice Scalia first discusses the Court's
opinion in Lohr. 142 Justice Scalia states that in Lohr, the Court decided
that the federal manufacturing and labeling requirements that applied to
almost all devices were not specific to the device in question, and were
not the kind of requirement under federal law that pre-empts common

136. See id. at 1005-06 and supra Part III.
137. See id. at 1006 and supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
138. Id. at 1006.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1006. Justice Scalia examines § 360k(a) and finds
two components necessary in order for the statute to pre-empt the Riegels' claims.
Id. First, there must be a requirement established by the Federal Government
applicable to the catheter. Id. Second, if there is a federal requirement, the Court
"must then determine whether the Riegels' common law claims are based upon
New York requirements with respect to the device that are 'different from, or in
addition to the' federal ones, and that relate to safety and effectiveness." Id. Part II
initiates the pre-emption analysis by considering whether the Federal Government
has established a requirement applicable to the catheter. Id.
142. Id.
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law claims under 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). 143 Instead, they were "entirely
generic concerns about device regulation generally."' 44 Also, he notes
that the Court rejected the manufacturer's argument that the § 510(k)
approval process imposed device specific requirements. 145 Instead, he
explains that devices that may be marketed through the § 510(k)
46
process are qualified for an exemption rather than a requirement. 1
Next, Justice Scalia applies the rationale used by the Court in Lohr
to the Riegels' claims, and finds that the premarket approval process,
unlike the § 510(k) substantial equivalence review, does impose federal
requirements under the MDA. 147 He reasons that unlike the general
labeling duties the Court considered in Lohr, the premarket approval
process is specific to individual devices.148 He states: "[T]he attributes
that Lohr found lacking in § 510(k) review are present here."' 149 He
distinguishes the § 510(k) review in Lohr from the premarket approval
process by explaining that the FDA does not impose any requirements
on devices that may be marketed under the § 510(k) process and does
not review the devices for safety and effectiveness.' 50 This is in

143. Id. According to Justice Scalia, the Court in Lohr was "substantially
informed" by the FDA regulation found in 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d). Id. at 1006 (citing
Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2240). The regulation states that state claims are pre-empted
"only when the Food and Drug Administration has established specific counterpart
regulations or there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular
device..." 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d). Based on this regulation, Justice Scalia states that
the Court in Lohr "concluded that federal manufacturing and labeling requirements
applicable across the board to almost all medical devices did not pre-empt the
common-law claims of negligence and strict liability at issue in Lohr." Id. at 1006.
He further states that the Court in Lohr came to this conclusion after a "careful
comparison between state and federal duties at issue." Id. at 1007.
144. Id. at 1006.
145. Id. at 1007. Justice Scalia explains that the Court in Lohr did not find the
§ 510(k) process to be a device specific requirement because devices that have
gone through the process have only been found to be the substantial equivalent of a
pre-1976 device. Id. Thus, he reasons that instead of meeting a federal
requirement, these devices are qualifying for an exemption. Id.
146. Id.
147. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1007.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. Instead, Justice Scalia emphasizes that devices entering the market
through the § 510(k) process are being reviewed for equivalence and not safety. Id.
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contrast to the premarket approval process, where the FDA focuses on
the safety and effectiveness of the device, and does not allow
manufacturers to deviate from the specifications in its approved
application.' 51
3. Justice Scalia Determines that the Riegels' Common Law Claims
Constitute Requirements Under § 360k(a).
In Part III of the majority opinion, Justice Scalia considers whether
the Riegels' common-law claims constitute a requirement under New
York law, which is "different from, or in addition to" federal
requirements and "relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or
to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the
device."' 5 2 Because "[s]afety and effectiveness are the very subject of
the Riegels' common law claims," Justice Scalia finds that the main
consideration is "whether New
York's tort duties constitute
'requirements' under the MA."' 53
In accordance with Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lohr,
Justice Scalia concludes that common law causes of action can be preempted by federal requirements specific to a medical device. 5 4 To

According to the Court in Lohr, the FDA is not requiring the device to "take any
particular form for any particular reason." Id. (citing Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2240).
151. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1007. Justice Scalia classifies the premarket
approval process as a federal requirement because the FDA is approving an
application based on a "reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness..." Id.
After the application has been approved, the manufacturer must comply with every
specification in the approved application. Id. Essentially, Justice Scalia is arguing
that the premarket approval stands in contrast to the §510(k) process because when
the FDA approves a premarket application, it requires a device to take a particular
form, which obligates the manufacturer to meet device specific requirements. Id.
152. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)). For Justice Scalia, interpreting the
MDA statutes is two-fold. Id. The threshold question has been resolved because
he concludes that the premarket approval process constitutes a Federal
"requirement" under the MDA. Id. He now decides the second question: whether
common law claims can be considered state requirements. Id.
153. Id. (citing 21 U.S. § 360k(a)).
154. Id. (citing Lohr, 518 U.S. at 512). In her concurring opinion in Lohr,
Justice O'Connor states:
To summarize, I conclude that § 360k(a)'s term "requirement"
encompasses state common-law claims. Because the statutory
language does not indicate that a "requirement" must be
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bolster his position, Justice Scalia cites to Bates v. Dow Agrosciences
LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005), and Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504 (1992), where the Court analyzed pre-emption statutes and
"held that a provision pre-empting 'state requirements' pre-empted
common law duties."'155 He believes that the Court must adhere to this
"normal meaning" and interpret the MDA to pre-empt the Riegels'
56
common law claims, because Congress did not indicate otherwise.'
He cites the plurality opinion in Cipollone for the proposition that
157
common-law liability is "premised on the existence of a legal duty."'
Because the common law remedy is damages, the states are "governing
58
conduct and controlling policy."'
To conclude his statutory analysis, he argues that it would make
little sense to pre-empt state law requirements yet not pre-empt

"specific," either to pre-empt or be pre-empted, I conclude that a
state common-law claim is pre-empted if it would impose "any
requirement" "which is different from, or in addition to,"
any
requirement applicable to the device under the FDCA.
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 514.
155. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1007-08 (citing Bates v. Agrosciences LLC, 544
U.S. 431 (2004); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (plurality
opinion)). In Bates, the Court held that common law actions could be pre-empted
by the provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA) that pre-empts different or additional State requirements. Bates, 544 U.S.
at 443. Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) of FIFRA: "Such State shall not impose or
continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or
different from those required under this subchapter." Id. (emphasis added).
Likewise, the plurality opinion in Cipollone held that common law actions
constitute state law requirements that can be pre-empted by the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 523. The pre-emption
provision of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 states: "No
requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under
State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act." 15
U.S.C. § 1334(b) (emphasis added).
156. Riegel, 128 S.Ct. at 1008.
157. Id. at 1008 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522). The Court in Cipollone
reasoned that because common law liability results in a tort judgment, then the
defendant who is liable for this tort judgment has violated an obligation under State
law. Id. Thus, the plaintiffs common law claims in Cipollone constituted state
law requirements pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Id.
158. Id. at 1008 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521).
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common law duties. 5 9 To do so would mean that the MDA is granting
more power to "a single state jury than to state officials acting through
state administrative or legislative lawmaking processes."' 60
He
concludes that there is no distinction between state common law and
state regulatory law in the MDA, and that the Court "will not turn
161
somersaults to create it."Following his interpretation of § 360k(a), Justice Scalia dismisses
two arguments advanced by Justice Ginsburg in her dissenting
opinion. 162 First, the dissent contends that it is "difficult to believe that
Congress would without comment, remove all means of judicial
recourse." 163 Justice Scalia rejects this contention by stating: "[T]his is
exactly what a pre-emption clause for medical devices does by its
terms."'1 64 Second, he responds to the dissent's argument that because
tort suits are permitted for drugs and additives, then the MDA should be
read to allow tort suits for medical devices. 165 Justice Scalia counters
this argument by asserting that if Congress wanted to treat both systems
159. Id. at 1008. "State tort law that requires a manufacturer's catheter to be
safer, but hence less effective, than the model the FDA has approved disrupts the
federal scheme no less than state regulatory law to the same effect." Id.
160. Id. Justice Scalia finds it hard to believe that the MDA would consider
tort liability imposed by juries outside of the scope of pre-emption, yet would preempt state statutes that are adopted by state agencies. Id. The state agency is
applying a "cost-benefit analysis similar to that applied by the experts at the FDA:
How many more lives will be saved by a device which, along with its greater
effectiveness, brings a greater risk of harm?" Id. On the other hand, the jury's
paramount consideration is the cost of the device, and is not concerned with the
benefits because "the patients who reaped benefits are not represented in the court."
Id.
161. Id. "That perverse distinction is not required or even suggested by the
broad language Congress chose in the MDA, and we will not turn somersaults to
create it." Id.
162. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009.
163. See id.
164. Id. Justice Scalia finds "[i]t is not our job to speculate upon
congressional motives." Id. Even if he were to look at Congress' motive in
enacting the MDA, he would consider the text of the statute, which he finds is "the
only indication available." Id. In his opinion, the text reveals: "the solicitude for
those injured by FDA-approved devices, which the dissent finds controlling, was
overcome in Congress's estimation by solicitude for those who would suffer
without new medical devices if juries were allowed to apply the tort law of 50
States to all innovations." Id.
165. See id.
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the same, it would not have wrote the pre-emption clause specifically
66
for medical devices.'
Lastly, Justice Scalia addresses the Riegels' argument against preemption.' 67 The Riegels' contend that even if common law claims do
impose requirements, they are not pre-empted by the MDA because
"general common law duties are not requirements maintained 'with
respect to devices."" 68 However, Justice Scalia finds this contrary to
the text of § 360k(a), and states that the statute does not require any
state requirement to apply only to the device in question, or just to a
69
medical device. 1
4. Justice Scalia Declines to Consider Whether the Riegels' Claims Are
Parallel to the Federal Requirements.
Justice Scalia concludes his opinion by recognizing that 21 U.S.C. §
360k(a)(1) does not pre-empt state claims that are "parallel" to federal
requirements.' 7 ° However, he finds that although the Riegels' now
raise the argument that their common-law claims are parallel to the
premarket approval process, the Court will not address this argument
because the Riegels did not make this contention in their briefs before
the Second Circuit, nor did they raise this argument in their petition for
certiorari.' 7 '

166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009-10.
Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner 34-36).
Id. at 1010.
The language of the statute does not bear the Riegel's reading.
The MDA provides that no State "may establish or continue in
effect with respect to a device.., any requirement" relating
to
safety and effectiveness that is different from, or in addition to,
federal requirements."
§ 360k(a) (emphasis added).
The
Riegels' suit depends upon New York's "continu[ing] in effect"
general tort duties "with respect to" Medtronic's catheter.
Nothing in the statutory text suggests that the pre-empted state
requirement must apply only to the relevant device, or only to
medical devices and not all products and all actions in general.

Id.
170. Id. at 1011.
171. Id.
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B. Justice Stevens' ConcurringOpinion

Justice Stevens joins the Court's judgment and all of its opinion,
except for Parts III-A and III-B. 7 2 While he agrees with the Court's
conclusion that the Riegels' common law claims are pre-empted by
§ 360k(a), he does not agree with the Court's discussion of the MDA's
73
principal purpose, and the history behind the pre-emption provision. 1
Thus, he "write[s] separately to add these few words about the MDA's
history and the meaning of 'requirements."" 74
Specifically, Justice Stevens opposes statements made by Justice
Scalia, where Stevens attempts to explain the history and congressional
purpose behind the MDA's enactment.1 75 First, he states that there is
nothing in the pre-enactment history that would suggest that Congress
enacted the MDA because state tort remedies were "imped[ing] the
development of medical devices. ' 76 Also, he notes that there is no
evidence that would show that the FDA thought the cost of injury by
approved medical devices was outweighed by "solicitude for those who
would suffer without new medical devices if juries were allowed to
apply the tort law of 50 State to all innovations."' 77 Justice Stevens
statements as policy arguments that lack
refers to the Court's
78
supporting evidence.

Instead, Justice Stevens finds Justice Ginsburg's dissent
persuasive.' 79
Specifically, he advocates Justice Ginsburg's
description of the MDA's purpose and states that: "the overriding
purpose of the legislation was to provide additional protection to
consumers, not to withdraw existing protections."80 Further, he
reasons that Congress enacted the pre-emption provision of the MDA

172. Id.1013 (Stevens, J., concurring).
173. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1011.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 1009; supra note 45.
178. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1012 (Stevens, J., concurring).
179. Id. Specifically, he agrees with the dissent's description of the history
and purpose behind the MDA. Id.
180. Id.
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to avoid conflicts between specific state statutes and the FDA's
premarket regulation. 181
Despite his opposition to the Court's view on the history and
purpose of the MDA, Justice Stevens agrees that the language of §
360k(a) does pre-empt common law claims. 82 Justice Stevens
believes that "[b]ecause common law rules administered by judges,
like statutes and regulations, create and define legal obligations,
some of them unquestionably qualify as 'requirements.'' 183 Thus, he
agrees with the Court's explanation as to why the New York
common-law duties constitute "requirements" with respect to the
1 84
device at issue.
C. Justice Ginsburg'sDissentingOpinion
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg argues that the
Court's interpretation of the MDA, "cut[s] deeply into a domain
historically occupied by state law."'' 8 She writes: "I dissent from
today's constriction of state authority. Congress, in my view, did not
intend § 360k(a) to effect a radical curtailment of state common-law
suits seeking compensation for injuries caused by defectively
designed or labeled medical devices."'' 86 In order to explain her
reasoning, Justice Ginsburg organizes her opinion into three parts.'87
Part I argues that absent a "clear and manifest purpose" by Congress,
the presumption is against pre-emption.188 In Part II, she counters the
Court's argument that absent any indication by Congress, common
law claims constitute state requirements under the MDA. 189 She
argues that contrary to the Court's opinion, it has been indicated that

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. To strengthen his argument, Justive Stevens quotes Cipollone: "[I]t is
the essence of common law to enforce duties that are either affirmative
requirements or negative prohibitions." Id. at 1012 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522 (1002) (emphasis added).
184. Id. at 1012-13 (Stevens, J., concurring).
185. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at at 1013 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1013-20.
188. Id. at 1013-14.
189. Id. at 1014-19.
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common law claims do not constitute state requirements under the
MDA. 190 Lastly, Justice Ginsburg concludes her opinion in Part III
by noting that even if the Court had adopted her opinion, the
premarket approval process would still be a relevant factor to be
91
considered by the jury.'
1. Justice Ginsburg Argues that There is a Presumption Against Preemption.
In order to interpret the meaning of § 360k(a), Justice Ginsburg
considers Congress' purpose. 192 She cites to Lohr and states that
"Courts have 'long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly preempt state law causes of action."' 193 Thus, she emphasizes that if
Congress intended for § 360k(a) to pre-empt an area traditionally
regulated by state law, then Congress would have clearly indicated this
as its purpose.' 94 Because Congress did not make such an indication,
the federal-state balance should not be disrupted.1 95 According to
Justice Ginsburg, where there are two plausible
readings of § 360k(a),
96
pre-emption.'
against
find
must
the Court

190. Id.
191. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1019-20.
192. Id.at 1013. She emphasizes the importance of Congress' purpose by
quoting the Court in Cipollone: "The 'purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone of pre-emption analysis."' Id. (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 504).
193. Id.(quoting Lohr,518 U.S. at 470).
194. Id. Justice Ginsburg states: "Preemption analysis starts with the
assumption that 'the historic police powers of the States [a]re not to be superseded.
. unless that as the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' Id. (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)).
195. Id. at 1013 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg states that "[t]he
presumption against preemption is heightened 'where federal law is said to bar
state action in fields of traditional state regulation."' Id. (quoting New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645
(1995).
196. Id. (citing Bates, 544 U.S. at 449).
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2. Justice Ginsburg's Contextual Analysis of § 360k(a) Indicates that
Congress did not Intend to Pre-empt Common Law Claims.
In the Court's opinion, Justice Scalia states: "Absent other
indication, reference to a State's 'requirements' includes its common
law duties."' 97 Justice Ginsburg argues that a contextual analysis of
§ 360k(a) reveals that there has been indication that a state's
98
requirement does not include common law duties.'
First, Justice Ginsburg discusses the history behind the MDA's
enactment. 99 She elaborates on the failures of the Dalkon Shield
intrauterine device, and the immense amount of litigation that resulted
from these failures.20 ° After taking these events into consideration, she
states: "Given the publicity attending the Dalkon Shield litigation and
Congress' awareness of the suits at the time the MDA was under
consideration, I find informative the absence of any sign of a legislative
design to preempt state common-law tort actions." ''
Because the
MDA was enacted during a time where numerous plaintiffs brought
suit under state tort law, Congress would have unambiguously stated
that the MDA was intended to pre-empt common law claims.20 2
Justice Ginsburg then addresses the Court's argument that
consumers have a remedy under § 360k(a), because the plaintiff can
seek a damages remedy for a claim based on a violation of FDA
regulations. 20 3 While she finds this remedy important, Justice Ginsburg
finds that it does not provide a remedy for consumers who are injured
by a device approved by the FDA.20 4 Because Congress has not
provided a federal compensatory remedy for consumers, Justice
Ginsburg believes that Congress did not intend to broadly pre-empt
common law claims. 20 5 She compellingly argues "[i]t is 'difficult to
believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008.
Id. at 1014 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1014-15.
Id.
Id. at 1015.
Id.
Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1011.
Id. at 1015 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
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judicial recourse' for large numbers of consumers injured by defective
medical devices."20 6 The Court's interpretation takes away a
significant layer of consumer protection, yet grants broad immunity to
"an entire industry that in the judgment of Congress, needed more
20 7
stringent regulation.,
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg believes that Congress' experience in
regulating drugs and food and color additives under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) provided the model for its regulation
of medical devices.2 °8 Much like Congress did for medical devices, it
also enacted premarket approval requirements between 1938 and 1976
for drugs and additives. 20 9 Like the MDA, Congress implemented
these federal premarket regulations at a time when there was a dramatic
increase in personal injury litigation under common law. 210 However,
in contrast to the MDA, the FDCA did not include a pre-emption
clause.2 1 1 Justice Ginsburg finds the reason for this distinction to be
evident: at the time the FDCA was enacted, "[s]tates had not installed
comparable control regimes in those areas. ,,212ShnoethtCnrs
She notes that Congress
included a pre-emption provision in the MDA not to proscribe tort
suits, but to prevent conflicts between state regulation schemes that
were already in place and the regulatory scheme found in the MDA.21 3
206. Id. (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984)).
207. Id. at 1016 (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 487).
208. Id. at 1016. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21
U.S.C. § 301 etseq.
209. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1017-18.
210. Id. at 1017 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1018.
213. Id. To emphasize the different situation that existed for medical devices
at the time the MDA was passed, Justice Ginsburg quotes the House Report:
In the absence of effective Federal regulation of medical devices,
some States have established their own programs. The most
comprehensive State regulation of which the committee is aware
is that of California, which in 1970 adopted the Sherman Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Law. This law requires premarket approval
for all new medical devices, requires compliance of device
manufacturers with good manufacturing practices and authorizes
inspection of establishments which manufacture devices.
Implementation of the Sherman Law has resulted in the
requirementthat intrauterine devices are subject to
premarket
clearance in California.
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Lastly, Justice Ginsburg addresses the Court's argument that
"Congress would not have wanted state juries to second-guess the
FDA's finding that a medical device is safe and effective when used as
directed. ' 214 She argues that because the premarket approval process
for drugs is "at least as rigorous" as it is for medical devices, and
common law claims have not been pre-empted for drugs, then
"Congress did not regard FDA regulation and state tort claims as
mutually exclusive."215
3. Justice Ginsburg Explains that her Reading of § 360k(a) Would Not
Render the FDA's Premarket Approval Irrelevant to the Riegels'
Common Law Claims.
In Part III, Justice Ginsburg notes that despite her disagreement
with the Court's opinion, her dissenting opinion does not render
premarket approval irrelevant to the Riegels' claims against
Medtronic.216 First, she states that a manufacturer can still argue that
there is a conflict between the plaintiffs theory and the FDA's
premarket approval of the device. 217 She refers to this possible defense
as "conflict preemption., 218 Second, she notes that a manufacturer can
defend its position by arguing that it complied with the FDA's
premarket application. 219 Justice Ginsburg notes that states generally
treat the manufacturer's compliance with the FDA's premarket
220
approval process as one factor taken into account by the jury.
Finally, Justice Ginsburg finishes her dissent with a conclusion that
captures the implications of the Court's opinion:
The Court's broad reading of § 360k(a) saves the
manufacturer from any need to urge these defenses.
Instead, regardless of the strength of a plaintiffs case,
suits will be barred ab initio. The constriction of state
authority ordered today was not mandated by Congress
Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-853 at 45 (emphasis added)).
214. Id. at 1018-19 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
215. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1018-19.
216. Id. at 1019.
217. Id. at 1019-20.
218. Id. at 1020.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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and is at odds with the MDA's central purpose: to
protect consumer safety.22 '
V. IMPACT

It took Medtronic nearly nine months to recall its product - a small
lead wire that connects an implantable cardiac defibrillator to the heart
- after first receiving reports that its product was defective and
dangerous to its users.22 2 This means that for nine months Medtronic
continued to sell the defective Sprint Fidelis lead, a lead that upon
fracture would either shock patients with painful electric jolts or would
fail to provide a life saving shock when a patient's heart needed one.22 3
Even when Medtronic recalled the product, 257,000 leads remained
implanted in patients. 224 The Riegel decision leaves patients with no
remedy when they are injured in the period between when a
manufacturer first learns of the defect and when the FDA recalls the
product.225 If the FDA wrongfully grants premarket approval to a Class
III device, Riegel places the risk of injuries or death caused by the
device on its user.226
According to Riegel, if the FDA has granted premarket approval to
a Class III device, then this approval imposes federal requirements on
the device that pre-empt any common law claim brought by injured
plaintiffs that are "different from, or in addition to" the requirements
under the premarket approval process.227 In the majority opinion,
Justice Scalia concentrates on the "rigorous regime" that the pre-market

221. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1020.

222. In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 081905, slip op. at 9-12 (D. Minn. filed Jan. 5, 2009).
223. Barnaby J. Feder, Medtronic Predicts Drop in Sales, N. Y. TIMES, Oct.

15, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/15/business/15cnddevice.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
224. In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 081905, slip op. at 12 (D. Minn. filed Jan. 5, 2009).
225. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 999. See In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads
Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 08-1905, (D. Minn. filed Jan. 5, 2009); In re Guidant Corp.
Implantable Defibrillators Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 05-1708, 2007 WL 1725289 (D.
Minn. June 12, 2007).
226. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 999.
227. 21 U.S.C. § 360k. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999.
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approval process has created for new Class III devices. 228 Furthermore,
he explains that manufacturers are subject to reporting requirements
even after the device has been approved.229 If the FDA finds the device
is unsafe or ineffective based on the reports submitted, then the FDA
can withdraw the product. 230 However, the MDA's current FDA
premarket approval process makes two assumptions that have left
injured plaintiffs with no remedy. 231 First, the current regime assumes
that the premarket approval process is sufficient to protect users from
unsafe products.232 Next, it assumes that if a defect arises after the
devices is marketed, then the FDA will immediately take the product
off the market by utilizing its recall authority. 233 To the contrary, the
FDA does make errors in granting premarket approval to devices, and
there is a prolonged period of time before these products are recalled.234
The inadequacies of the premarket approval process, and the time
lag that Riegel did not account for, became apparent on January 5,
2009.235 The District Court of Minnesota interpreted Riegel, and held
that plaintiffs common law claims for injuries or death, resulting from
Medtronic's Sprint Fidelis leads, were pre-empted by the Medical
Device Amendments.236
The Sprint Fidelis received premarket

228. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1004-05.
229. Id. at 1005.
230. Id.
231. See Medical Device Amendments, 21 U.S.C. § 360 etseq.
232. World Health Organization, Medical Device Regulations: Global
Overview and Guiding Principles 12 (2003), available at www.who/int/medical_devices/publications/en/MDRegulations.pdf "No amount of rigour in the premarketing review process can predict all possible device failures or incidents arise
from device misuse. It is through actual use that unforeseen problems related to
safety and performance can occur." Id.
233. See In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 081905, (D. Minn. filed Jan. 5, 2009); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators
Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 05-1708, 2007 WL 1725289 (D. Minn. June 12, 2007).
234. In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 08-1905
(D. Minn. filed Jan. 5, 2009).
235. Id. Following the recall of the Sprint Fidelis leads, plaintiffs began suing
Medtronic for strict liability and negligence. Id. at 12. Plaintiffs filed a Master
Consolidated Complaint against Medtronic containing 21 claims in this
multidistrict litigation. Id.
236. Id. Medtronic submitted the premarket approval application for the
Sprint Fidelis Leads in November of 2004. Id. at 10. According to the plaintiffs,
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approval by the FDA in June of 2004.237 In 2006, patients with
implantable cardiac defibrillators (ICDs) began to suffer painful shocks
and began submitting reports to Medtronic. 238
After medical
investigation, a physician concluded that the shocks were caused by
fractures in the leads.239 It was not until May of 2007 that Medtronic
filed a supplemental premarket approval application with the FDA
containing design and manufacturing changes to the product in order to
fix the defect.240 The application was approved by the FDA in July of
2007.24 1 However, Medtronic continued to sell the previously
manufactured Sprint Fidelis leads to hospitals, and they were implanted
into patients.242 Further, it was not until September 10, 2007 that
Medtronic filed 120 adverse reports with the FDA concerning the
product, and not until October 15, 2007 that Medtronic voluntarily
recalled the Sprint Fidelis leads and the FDA issued a Class I recall.243
the leads were 2.1 inches wide. In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prod.
Liab. Litig., No. 08-1905, slip op. at 10 (D. Minn. filed Jan. 5, 2009).
237. Id. at 11. An example of a patient who suffered painful shocks from the
defect in the Sprint Fidelis leads is a sixty-eight year old grandmother, Liz Fossum.
Janet Moore, Seeking Relieffrom Medical Device Makers, STAR TRIBUNE, Feb. 7,
2009, http://www.startribune.com/business/39232102.html (last visited Oct. 25,
2009). The article states: "For about an hour early that November morning two
years ago, Fossum's implanted defibrillator repeatedly shocked her heart - 54 times
all told. It felt like a horse was kicking her in the chest." Id. Fossum brought a
lawsuit against Medtronic, but her case was dismissed under Riegel. Id.
238. In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 081905, slip op. at 11 (D. Minn. filed Jan. 5, 2009). This investigation was done by a
physician at the Minneapolis Heart Institute. Id. The physician concluded that the
shocks were caused by fractures in the lead. Id. Another physician at Cornell
University agreed with this conclusion. Id.
239. Id. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that Medtronic was filing the
new application to correct the defects in the leads. Id. However, Plaintiffs also
alleged that Medtronic did not notify the FDA that it was filing the new application
because of the lead failures. Id.
240. In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 081905, slip op. at 11 (D. Minn. filed Jan. 5, 2009).
241. Id. at 12.
242. Id.
243. Bamaby J. Feder, Medtronic Predicts Drop in Sales, N. Y. TIMES, Oct.
15, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/15/business/15cnddevice.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2009). Doctors say that the Sprint Fidelis leads
were often used in children because of its "narrow girth." Anna Wilde Mathews &
Thomas M. Burton, Heart Wires May Pose Risk for the Young, WALL ST. J.,
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Yet by the time the leads were recalled, approximately 257,000 Sprint
Fidelis leads had already been implanted into patients. 2 ' According to
research, 4,000 to 5,000 of these patients will experience lead fracture
within thirty months of implantation.245
All 257,000 patients are left without some form of remedy.246 The
patients who have experienced a lead malfunction are unable to recover
damages under Riegel.247 The patients who have consulted their doctor
and have been advised to undergo explant surgery, must be subjected to
a dangerous surgery in order to replace the lead.248 According to
experts, the surgery is so dangerous that they believe patients are better
off leaving the lead in place unless it has "stopped functioning
properly." 249 The remaining patients are in danger of being one of the
4,000 to 5,000 patients who will experience fracture within thirty
months of implantation. 250 According to Riegel, Medtronic is immune
from liability for any of these consequences, simply because the FDA

granted its device premarket approval. 2 51 Because of the Court's
decision in Riegel, patients are left with no remedy even though
Medtronic knew for nearly nine months that its product was dangerous
252
to its users.

The adverse effects of the current recall system is also illustrated
when considering Guidant Corporation's Prizm 2 implantable cardiac

October 19, 2007, at A4. There are studies showing that the leads will be more
likely to fracture in younger patients because their hearts tend to beat faster, and
they are more active. Id. There were 265,000 Sprint Fidelis leads implanted into
patients, and 2,085 of them were implanted into patients under the age of twentyone. Id. Doctors say that the failure rate of younger patients is higher than that of
older patients. Id.
244. See In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 081905, (D. Minn. filed Jan. 5, 2009).
245. Id.; Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999.
246. Anna Wilde Mathews & Thomas M. Burton, Heart Wires May Pose
More Risk For The Young, WALL ST. J., October 19, 2007, at A4.
247. Id. According to doctors, removing the lead can be more dangerous than
having the lead fracture. Id.
248. Feder, Medtronic Predicts Drop in Sales, supra note 243.
249. Riegel, 128 S.Ct. at 999.
250. Feder, Medtronic Predicts Drop in Sales, supra note 243.
251. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 051708, 2007 WL 1725289 at 1 (D. Minn. June 12, 2007).
252. Id.
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defibrillator (ICD).253 In August of 2000, the FDA granted premarket
approval to the defibrillator as a Class III device. 254 In February of
2002, Guidant received reports of an "arcing," or short-circuiting in the
device. 255 After the device was explanted from the patient, Guidant
tested the Prizm 2 and found that the short-circuiting was caused by
polymide deterioration in the header and inadequate wire spacing. 25 6 In
April of 2002, Guidant instituted a design and manufacturing change
plan to solve the short-circuiting problem. 257 However, Guidant
continued to sell the pre-April Prizm, and failed to notify the public of
the device's tendency to short-circuit.258 It was not until the New York
Times published an article in March of 2005, detailing the death of a
twenty-one year old college student, which resulted from a Prizm 2
failure, that Guidant finally issued a public notice in May of 2005.259 In
this notice, Guidant confirmed that they had received reports that
twenty-six Prizm devices have resulted in at least one death and at least
two cases of bodily injury. 26 ° Guidant finally recalled the device on
June 17, 2005, and thousands of patients had the device explanted
shortly thereafter. 261 Guidant agreed to pay for replacement devices
and other minor incidental costs, but refused to pay for the explant
surgeries or costs associated with the surgeries.262
As the two preceding examples illustrate, users of Class III devices
are being left with no remedy. They are denied remedy even when they
are injured after the time the manufacturer learns of the risks.
Additionally, the time it takes to recall the products after reports start
surfacing leaves consumers in great danger, as they are not notified of

253. Id. at 14-20.
254. Id. at 2.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 14-20.
257. In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 051708, 2007 WL 1725289 (D. Minn. June 12, 2007).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 081905, (D. Minn. filed Jan. 5, 2009); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators
Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 05-1708, 2007 WL 1725289 (D. Minn. June 12, 2007).
262. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1090, at 1 (1976) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. REP. No. 94853, at 6-12.

680

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

29-2

the risks. The injustice that results from denying any remedy to
patients is magnified when the device involved is implanted.263 This
result is inconsistent with Congress' purpose in enacting the MIDA: to
protect consumers from dangerous devices and to prevent the
264
distribution of dangerous devices.
Additionally, it is at odds with the savings clause codified in the
MDA, 21 U.S.C. § 360(h), which states: "[c]ompliance with an order
issued under this section shall not relieve any persons from liability
under Federal or State law." 265 The MDAs were enacted in order to
provide consumers with an extra layer of protection before Class III
devices are marketed.266 Yet, the Supreme Court's decision in Riegel,
and its interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 360k of the MDA, takes away all
consumer protection. 267 When the MDAs were introduced on the
Senate Floor, Senator Edward Kennedy stated: "The legislation is
written so that the benefit of the doubt is always given to the consumer.
After all, it is the consumer who pays with his health and his life for
medical device malfunctions. '268 Instead of protecting consumers as
Congress intended, Riegel strips away the common law remedies that
were once available, and gives manufacturers immunity so long as the
FDA has granted premarket approval to its device.2 69
VI. CONCLUSION

The Court's decision in Riegel decision affects the regulation of the
most risky and complex medical devices: Class III devices. These life
sustaining devices, such as catheters, pacemakers, and implantable
cardiac defibrillators are those in which our loved ones rely upon. Yet
because the Court's decision in Riegel gives manufacturers immunity
from liability for later discovered defects, consumers are left unsure of
how reliable their medical devices really are. Though the Riegel
263. See In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 081905, (D. Minn. filed Jan. 5, 2009); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators
Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 05-1708, 2007 WL 1725289 (D. Minn. June 12, 2007).
264. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1090, at 1; H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 6-12.
265. 21 U.S.C. § 360(h).
266. See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 999.
267. See id.
268. 121 CONG. REc. 9, 10688 (1975).
269. See generally Riegel, 128 S. Ct.at 999.
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decision provides courts with a bright line rule to interpret the preemption statute in the MDA, it leaves consumers with less certainty as
to whether the device implanted inside of them is actually safe. The
impact of this decision can already be seen as thousands of patients
have been injured by Medtronic's Sprint Fidelis leads and Guidant
Prizm 2 defibrillator, and are left with no remedy.27° Further, because
most Class III devices are implanted into patients, the FDA cannot
quickly alleviate the situation when a defect is discovered. Instead of
giving consumers an extra layer of protection, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the MDA to take away a plaintiffs right to seek judicial
recourse, and has disrupted the American tort law system.

270. See In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 081905, (D. Minn. filed Jan. 5, 2009); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators
Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 05-1708, 2007 WL 1725289 (D. Minn. June 12, 2007).

